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The  2008  ﬁnancial  crisis,  and  the  subsequent  global  recession,  triggered  a wide-spread
economic  and  political  debate  on  the  proper  policy  combination  to deal  with  the  crisis  and
to  prevent  similar  ones  in  the future.  Probably,  the  main  dispute  has  been  around  the  use
of ﬁscal  instruments  in  order  to  foster  growth  while  keeping  public  debt  under  control.  The
European  Union,  for  instance,  endorsed  “austerity”  measures  for  ﬁscal  consolidation  but  has
been  sharply  criticized  by several  scholars.  This  paper  aims  at contributing  to the  current
debate  by presenting  the  outcomes  of a computational  study  performed  with  the  Eurace
agent-based  model.  We  set up  an experiment  with  two base  policy  scenarios,  i.e., stability
and growth  pact  and  ﬁscal  compact,  incrementally  enriching  them  with  complementary
policies  which  relax  ﬁscal  rigidity  and  introduce  quantitative  easing.  Results  show  that
budgetary  rigour  performs  well  if  and only  if some  mechanisms  of  ﬁscal  relaxation  and
monetary accommodation  are  considered  during  bad  times;  thus  conﬁrming  in  a richer
and more  realistic  model  setting  the  fundamental  tenet  of  Keynesian  economics  about  the
importance  of sustaining  aggregate  demand  during  recessions.
©  2017  Elsevier  B.V.  All  rights  reserved.
. Introduction
Following the 2008/2009 ﬁnancial and economic crisis and the consequent bailout of important ﬁnancial institutions,
ost OECD countries experienced large deﬁcits and a signiﬁcant increase of public debt. The 2010 recovery induced policy
akers, in particular in the European Monetary Union where the room of manoeuvre of ﬁscal policy is conditioned by
reaties, to shift the attention from the ﬁnancial crisis and its causes to the need of ﬁscal consolidation measures aimed to
ut public ﬁnances on a more “sustainable” path.Please cite this article in press as: Teglio, A., et al., Budgetary rigour with stimulus in lean times: Policy advices from an
agent-based model. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.016
In the political and theoretical debate, it became popular the assumption that ﬁscal consolidation could be very suc-
essful in reducing public deﬁcit, in particular due to its claimed expansionary effects. The so-called expansionary austerity
ypothesis was supported by both empirical analysis, see e.g. Alesina and Ardagna (2010) and references therein, and theo-
etical arguments. Under the theoretical perspective, ﬁscal austerity might have expansionary effects because, if we assume
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: teglio@uji.es (A. Teglio), andrea.mazzocchetti@edu.unige.it (A. Mazzocchetti), linda.ponta@unige.it (L. Ponta), marco.raberto@unige.it
M.  Raberto), silvano.cincotti@unige.it (S. Cincotti).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.016
167-2681/© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
G Model ARTICLE IN PRESSJEBO-4151; No. of Pages 25
2 A. Teglio et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization xxx (2017) xxx–xxx
forward-looking economic agents, today’s sacriﬁces may  create expectations of tax reductions, higher disposable income,
and lower interest rates1 in the future, then inducing agents to increase consumption and investment in the short term.
However, economies subject to austerity programs experienced a second severe contraction of economic activity soon
after 2010; in addition, bond yields of peripheral Euro-zone countries, skyrocketed to unsustainable levels in 2011. Indeed,
beside the literature supporting expansionary austerity, a huge body of both theoretical and empirical work advocating the
contrary exists, dating back at least to Keynes’ General Theory (1936) and Lerner’s functional ﬁnance (Lerner and Harris,
1951). In particular, in recent years, in response to the 2008/09 crisis, a number of studies has appeared emphasizing the
importance of expansionary ﬁscal policy during recessions. DeLong and Summers (2012) provide theoretical and empirical
evidence about the efﬁcacy of temporary expansionary ﬁscal policy in severely depressed economies, in both the short and
the long term. The argumentation is that the underemployment of production factors as well as low interest rates make the
ﬁscal multiplier substantially greater than in normal times, as also pointed out by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) and
Ferraresi et al. (2014). Furthermore, mitigating present output drops, by means of expansionary ﬁscal policies, prevents the
long-term hysteresis effects of the lower capital accumulation rate and workers’ skills on the economy’s future potential.
A new term, balance-sheet recession, has also been coined to deﬁne the 2008/09 crisis as well as the Japan two  last
decades of the 90s and 00s (Koo, 2009, 2011, 2014). A balance-sheet recession is the economic crisis that usually follows
an asset bubble burst. In this scenario, where the market value of assets collapses while the nominal value of debt remains
unchanged, the private sector (households, ﬁrms) becomes over-indebted and faces the risk of negative net worth; therefore
deleveraging, more than proﬁt maximization, becomes the priority of the private sector, which uses its cash ﬂows to reduce
indebtedness instead of ﬁnancing investments. This deleveraging priority makes also the private sector unwilling to borrow,
even at very low interest rates, with ﬁnancial institutions that are also unwilling to lend, because they need to reduce the
risk of their balance sheets. In such a scenario, where private consumption and investment demand decrease, it is therefore
argued that the public sector should actually move in the opposite direction, i.e., perform a ﬁscal stimulus, which would be
easily ﬁnanced due to the excess saving and the low interest rates, with the aim to sustain businesses and households cash
ﬂows and to easy balance sheets repair without forcing the economy into depression.
Guajardo et al. (2011), using a different estimation method with respect to the one used by Alesina and Ardagna (2010),
ﬁnd empirical evidence that ﬁscal consolidation has actually contractionary effects on private domestic demand and GDP,
in contrast to the estimates made by Alesina and Ardagna (2010), which the authors show to be biased toward overstating
expansionary effects.
De Grauwe and Ji (2012) ﬁnd evidence that a large part of the surge in the spreads of the peripheral Eurozone countries
during 2010/11 was disconnected from ﬁscal fundamentals and was actually the result of time dependent negative market
sentiments caused by the particular situation of government bond markets in a monetary union, where countries, being
without their own currency, can be subject to self-fulﬁlling liquidity crises, which instead are ruled out in countries with
full monetary sovereignty. Furthermore, if a country in such a scenario is forced into austerity with the aim to reduce bond
spreads, high interest rates, impossibility to devaluate the currency, and ﬁscal consolidation, may cause a deep recession
and transform a liquidity crisis in a solvency crisis.
Depending on the economic conditions and on the institutional setting, ﬁscal austerity may  then turn out to be depressive
and self-defeating while ﬁscal stimulus could actually turn out to be expansionary and self-ﬁnancing. Several scholars,
like Nobel laureates P. Krugman and J. Stiglitz,2 suggested the use of expansionary ﬁscal policies along with monetary
accommodation in order to ﬁght the crisis (Krugman, 2013).
Based on the current academic and political discussion, we design several policy strategies to be tested and compared in
the framework of an enriched version of the agent-based Eurace model (Cincotti et al., 2010, 2012a,b; Raberto et al., 2012;
Teglio et al., 2012; Ponta et al., 2018). For this purpose, we  argue that the agent-based approach (see e.g. Tesfatsion and Judd,
2006; LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008) has some advantage with respect to mainstream approaches in macroeconomics based
on dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. It allows for more realistic agents’ behaviour, based on heuristics and
behavioural patterns, see e.g. Akerlof, 2002), instead of perfect rationality, and it also allows for non-clearing and decen-
tralized markets, see Raberto et al. (2008a). Furthermore, agent-based modelling allows for out-of-equilibrium aggregate
outcomes, emerging from the complex pattern of agents’ interaction (Colander et al., 2008; Kirman, 1992).
Among the agent-based macro-models in circulation, see e.g. Ashraf et al. (2014), Delli Gatti et al. (2011), Gabbi et al.
(2015), Gualdi et al. (2015), Rengs and Wäckerle (2014), Riccetti et al. (2013), and Wäckerle et al. (2014), it is worth citing the
Keynesian model by Dosi et al. (2010), which has been recently used to test different ﬁscal and monetary policy scenarios
(Dosi et al., 2013, 2015). Results show that the introduction of constrained ﬁscal rules mimicking the stability and growth
pact or the ﬁscal compact worsen the performance of the economy as well as public ﬁnances, while the best policy mixPlease cite this article in press as: Teglio, A., et al., Budgetary rigour with stimulus in lean times: Policy advices from an
agent-based model. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.016
able to stabilize macroeconomic fundamentals is the combination of an unconstrained ﬁscal policy with a dual-mandate
monetary policy, targeting both inﬂation and unemployment. Among other agent-based studies on the recent crisis, Assenza
et al. (2015) focus on the emergence of a crisis from micro behavioural interactions, while Klimek et al. (2015) focus on crisis
1 A related common justiﬁcation of austerity programs was the risk that bond markets, whenever a government is not sufﬁciently committed to budget
balance, may  demand huge spreads for sovereign debt and possibly push a nation into default.
2 There are many articles around. See for example Stiglitz’s “Agenda to save the Euro” and Krugman’s “The Depressed Economy Is All About Austerity”
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/24/the-depressed-economy-is-all-about-austerity/.
G Model
J
r
t
t
m
d
h
b
m
ﬁ
c
c
a
c
t
m
a
2
b
ﬁ
c
b
i
a
c
a
o
w
e
b
t
o
e
g
l
c
b
s
(
t
G
a
e
r
d
t
iARTICLE IN PRESSEBO-4151; No. of Pages 25
A. Teglio et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization xxx (2017) xxx–xxx 3
esolution mechanisms, ﬁnding that there are no economic conditions under which a taxpayer-funded bail-out outperforms
he bail-in mechanism with private sector involvement.
In particular, our work shares some similarities with Dosi et al. (2015), because both papers use an agent-based model
o contribute to the recent debate about the role of ﬁscal austerity during economic crises. However, while Dosi’s model is
ore focused on modelling growth and innovation, our model presents a more sophisticated consumption market where
emand and supply are entirely endogenous, and a ﬁnancial market where households can invest their savings. In particular,
ouseholds can ﬁnance ﬁrms by purchasing newly-issued stocks and lend to the government by purchasing newly-issued
onds. This last feature has of course a central role when studying the effects of ﬁscal policy. It is worth noting that the two
odels, although developed independently and in parallel, reach similar policy conclusions, suggesting the importance of
scal ﬂexibility during downturns.
In order to investigate the effects of different ﬁscal policies, we design simulations which diverge only on the edge of a
risis. As shown in Raberto et al. (2012) and Cincotti et al. (2012b), the Eurace model is able to reproduce endogenous business
ycles with recessions of different duration and severity. The idea is therefore to let simulations run undifferentiated until
 crisis occurs, and to activate the different policy strategies after the ﬁrst crisis. This setting provides the opportunity to
ompare, ceteris paribus, how different policies can affect the development of a crisis, measuring some key indicators like
he average duration of the crisis, average unemployment, inﬂation or GDP, among others.
The paper is divided as follows: in the next section we  present an overview of Eurace, while in the Appendices we provide
ore details on the model design and validation. In Section 3 we  describe the proposed ﬁscal and monetary policy scenarios,
nd in Section 4 we discuss the results of computational experiments. Finally, we  draw our main conclusions in Section 5.
. Overview of the Eurace model
Eurace is an agent-based macroeconomic model and simulator which is under development since 2006. The model is
ased on the interaction among several classes of economic agents: households, which act as workers, consumers and
nancial investors; consumption goods producers (CGPs), henceforth ﬁrms, producing homogenous consumption goods; a
apital goods producer (KGP), producing homogeneous investment goods; commercial banks; a government, and a central
ank.
Agents interact through different markets where consumption goods and capital goods, labour and credit are exchanged
n a decentralized setting with disperse prices set by suppliers and based on costs. Agents’ behaviour is modelled as myopic
nd characterized by limited information, scarce computational capabilities and adaptive expectations. For instance, CGPs are
haracterized by a short-term proﬁt objective and make production and investment plans where expected future revenues
re based on backward-looking expectations determined by past sales and prices. In particular, production plans depend
n past sales and the inventory stock, along the lines of the inventory management literature (Hillier and Lieberman, 1986),
hile sale prices are determined by a mark-up on costs (wages and debt interests), see e.g. Plott and Sunder (1982), Fabiani
t al. (2006). Investment plans depend on the cost of capital goods and the present value3 of the additional foreseen revenues,
ut are limited by both by internal4 and external ﬁnancing capabilities.5
Households set the consumption budget out of their income following a wealth to income target ratio, according to
he theory of buffer-stock saving (Carroll, 2001; Deaton, 1992), which states that consumption expenses mainly depend
n the need to accumulate a target stock of liquid wealth to be used as a buffer in cases of income downfalls, due to
.g. unemployment. Savings can be allocated in stocks (i.e. the claims on ﬁrms/banks equity and future dividends) and
overnment bonds, which are traded in a centralized Walrasian ﬁnancial market.
Banks have the function to provide short-term loans to ﬁrms at an interest rate determined by the cost of central bank
oans, i.e. the policy rate, plus a mark-up. It is worth noting that, in line with the working of the banking system in a modern
apitalist economy (see e.g. McLeay et al., 2014), banks lending is not limited by the available liquidity and, whenever a
ank grants a loan, a corresponding deposit, entitled to the borrower, is created on the liability side of the bank’ balance
heet. Furthermore, if it happens that a bank becomes short of liquidity after the settlements of all payments of its clients
households, ﬁrms, the capital good producer), the bank gets loans from the central bank which can provide liquidity to
he banking system in inﬁnite supply. In line with the post-Keynesian literature, see e.g. Fontana (2003) and Lavoie and
odley (2012), we then follow the endogenous money modelling approach, where loans come before deposits, not viceversa,
nd, whenever the private sector is willing to borrow more money, banks normally provide more loans and then create
ndogenously more banking deposits, i.e., new money. Bank lending is however limited by a Basel II-like capital requirementPlease cite this article in press as: Teglio, A., et al., Budgetary rigour with stimulus in lean times: Policy advices from an
agent-based model. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.016
ule; in this respect, each bank assesses the loan risk by considering the ﬁnancial leverage of the prospective borrower before
eciding about a loan request. Finally, a distinctive feature of the Eurace modelling approach is that every agents is modelled
hrough a double-entry balance sheet that includes the details of all assets and liabilities.
3 According to empirical surveys (Graham and Harvey, 2001, 2002), the net present value is one of the most popular method used by managers to evaluate
nvestments.
4 Along the lines of Fazzari et al. (2008).
5 The pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) is adopted to determine a hierarchy of ﬁnancial sources for the ﬁrm.
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Table 1
Sectorial balance sheet matrix. Subscripts represent the index of the agent to which the stock refers. Uppercase subscripts are used when the stock refers
to  a whole sector, whereas lowercase subscripts are used when it refers to a single agent (for instance in the case of sums). Finally, superscript characters
are  introduced when the balance sheet counterpart is more than one single sector.
Households (H) CGPs (F) KGP (K) Banks (B) Government (G) Central bank (CB) 
Capital +KF pK +KF pK
Inventories +IF pc +IF pc
Government bonds +nH
G
pG −nG pG +nCBG pG 0
Debt/credit −Loans +Loans +LoansCB 0
−LoansCB
Private liquidity +MH +MF +MK −DB 0
Banks,  government liquidity +MB +MG −DCB 0
CB  liquidity/ﬁat money +MCB +MCB,0
−FiatCB
Traded equity +f nEf pEf −EF f nEf pEf − EF
+nEk pEk −EK +nEk pEk − EK
+bnEb pEb −EB +bnEb pEb − EB
Equity −EH −EG −ECB −EH − EG − ECB
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 2
Sectorial transaction ﬂow matrix of agents populating the EURACE economy.
Households (H)CGPs (F) KGP (K) Banks (B) Government (G)Central bank (CB) 
Current
account
Consumption − + 0
Wages  + − − − 0
Transfers + − 0
Investment − + 0
Taxes  − − − − + 0
Dividends + − − − 0
Coupons + − + 0
CB  coupons payback + − 0
Banks  loan interests − + 0
CB  loans interests − + 0
CB  interests payback + − 0
=  = = = = =
Net  cash ﬂow Savings Proﬁts Proﬁts Proﬁts Surplus Seignoirage 0
Capital
account
Net  cash ﬂow +Savings +Proﬁts +Proﬁts +Proﬁts +Surplus +Seignoirage 0
  Capital +fKfpK −KKpK 0
  Loans + Loans − Loans − LoansCB 0
+ LoansCB 0
  Issue of new shares/bonds −f pEf nEf +f pEf nEf +pEGnEG 0
−pEGnEG 0
  Quantitative easing +pEGnQEEG −pEGn
QE
EG
0
  private liquidity &  Banks’ deposits − MH − MF − MK + DB 0
  banks/public liquidity &  Central bank deposits − MB − MG + DCB 0
  CB liquidity/ ﬁat money +M −  Fiat 0CB CB
  0 0 0 0 0 0
Following the approach used in Godley and Lavoie (2012), we provide a compact description of the model, which is
rather complex, by presenting three signiﬁcant matrices. Table 1 reports the balance sheet matrix, describing all assets and
liabilities for each sector (here a sector has to be seen as a class of agents). Table 2, called transaction ﬂow matrix, shows all
the stock and monetary ﬂows among agents. Table 3, called revaluation matrix, reports for each sector the variations in the
stock level that are not due to ﬂows but to changes in the stock price. This approach allows to check the consistency at any
time step between stocks and ﬂows in the model, both at the level of the single agent and at the aggregate one, in line also
with post-Keynesian stock-ﬂow-consistent modelling approach, see e.g. Caverzasi and Godin (2015).
In matrix 1 a plus (minus) sign corresponds to agents’ assets (liabilities) and each column can be read as the aggregated
balance sheet of a speciﬁc sector (e.g. households). Rows show assets and claims of assets among sectors, thus generally
adding up to zero. Exceptions are capital and inventories, which are accumulated by CGPs, and households’ equity shares,
which are issued by CGPs, KGP and banks and do not add up to zero because of the difference between market price and
book value.
In Table 2, the current account describes the ﬂows of revenues (plus sign) and payments (minus sign) that agents getPlease cite this article in press as: Teglio, A., et al., Budgetary rigour with stimulus in lean times: Policy advices from an
agent-based model. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.016
and make. Agents are reported in the columns and monetary ﬂows are reported in the rows. The result of agents’ sector
transactions is the net cash ﬂow. The capital account section of Table 2 describes the balance sheets changes related to each
sector.
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Table  3
Sectorial revaluation matrix of agents populating the EURACE economy.
Households (H) CGPs (F) KGP (K) Banks (B) Government (G) Central bank (CB) 
Equityt−1 EH,t−1 EF,t−1 EK,t−1 EB,t−1 EG,t−1 ECB,t−1 ETOT,t−1
Net cash ﬂow +Savings +Proﬁts +Proﬁts +Proﬁts +Surplus +Seignoirage 0
Revaluations/devaluations
Capital +fpKKf +fpKKf
Inventories +fpcIf +fpcIf
Equity shares +fpEf nEf +fpEf nEf
+bpEbnEb +bpEbnEb
+pEk nEk +pEk nEk
Bonds +pGnHG -pGnG +pGnCBG 0
=  = = = = = =
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Special attention deserves the money creation mechanism in the model. The central bank has two  channels to introduce
ew liquidity (or Fiat money) into the system. The ﬁrst one is via loans provided to banks when they are in liquidity shortage.
he second is through quantitative easing operations, i.e., purchase of government bonds in the secondary market. In both
ases, the economic agents deposit an amount equal to the new Fiat money in the banking sector (agents who got loans
rom banks or who sold bonds to the CB), generating additional liquidity that is deposited at the central bank and, in turn,
enerates new liquidity of the central bank that is always equal to the amount of Fiat money created. This is the reason why
n Table 1, the difference between ﬁat money and central bank liquidity is always constant (and equal to the initial central
ank liquidity). It is also worth noting that the money supply in the economy can variate independently from the ﬁat money
reated by the central bank, because it endogenously raises every time a bank grants a new loan and it decreases when the
oan is paid back.
. Fiscal and monetary policy scenarios
We  consider eight combined ﬁscal and monetary policy scenarios, which can be grouped in two  main sets, each charac-
erized by four policies, i.e., a baseline policy scenario plus three additional nested speciﬁcations. The two baseline policy
cenarios are named ﬁscal compact (FC) and stability and growth pact (SGP), respectively. The two  names refer to the two
ell-known European treaties6 designed to ensure that countries in the European Union pursue sound public ﬁnances and
oordinate their ﬁscal policies. In particular, the SGP policy scenario sets the public deﬁcit ro GDP ratio as the fundamental
olicy target, while the FC policy scenario addresses the level of the public debt to GDP ratio. Our deﬁnitions do not match
xactly the ofﬁcial EU agreements7 but have merely the purpose to recall in a stylized way the key elements addressed by the
orresponding European agreements. In both cases, tax rates on labour and corporate earnings, as well as the value-added
ax are the policy instruments considered to get the two  targets within pre-determined limits.
For each baseline policy scenario, three further nested policy speciﬁcations are then considered during periods of eco-
omic crisis, deﬁned here as periods when the unemployment rate is higher than a given threshold. These additional policy
peciﬁcations, if selected, are effective only during crises, irrespectively from the deﬁcit and debt to GDP levels. The new
olicies are named as: unemployment escape clause (U), which rules out tax hikes; quantitative easing (QE), consisting in
he purchase of government bonds by the central bank in the secondary market; ﬁscal accommodation (FA), where tax rates
re always decreased during crisis periods.
The three different policy speciﬁcations outlined above are characterized by increasing strength in counteracting the two
aseline scenarios in times of high unemployment. The ﬁrst choice would be the adoption of the unemployment escape
lause (U), avoiding an increase of tax rates even if deﬁcit or debt to GDP ratios are above their thresholds; in addition to
his, the policy maker could also pursue unconventional monetary policy measures (QE) with the aim to sustain bond price
nd then facilitate government debt ﬁnancing in times of decreasing ﬁscal revenues; ﬁnally, the previous two policies can
e complemented by a ﬁscal accommodation (FA) where tax rates are quickly (on a monthly basis) lowered to increase the
urchasing power of the private sector. Given their particular design, the three policies measures are not applied indepen-Please cite this article in press as: Teglio, A., et al., Budgetary rigour with stimulus in lean times: Policy advices from an
agent-based model. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.016
ently to the two baseline scenarios, but are taken into consideration following the particular order of adoption previously
utlined.
6 It is worth noting that the stability and growth pact, born in 1997 and later amended, is embodied in the European law, while the ﬁscal compact is an
ntergovernmental treaty, signed in 2012 by 25 EU member states, which introduces a new stricter version of the stability and growth pact.
7 The stability and growth pact is a set of rules designed to ensure that countries in the European Union pursue sound public ﬁnances
nd  coordinate their ﬁscal policies (http://ec.europa.eu/economy ﬁnance/economic governance/sgp/index en.htm). The Treaty on Stability, Coor-
ination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, commonly known as ﬁscal compact, can be retrieved by request here:
ttp://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/.
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Results related to the two baseline policy scenarios, SGP and FC, as well as the additional speciﬁcations, will be presented
and discussed. In particular, for both baseline cases, we will then have 3 additional policy scenarios. In the SGP case, they
will be named as SGP + U, SGP + U + QE, and SGP + U + QE + FA. We  will have analogues scenario names in the FC case.
In the following, we provide the details about the implementation of the two baseline monetary and ﬁscal policy scenarios:
3.1. Stability and growth pact (SGP)
SGP scenario targets a level of yearly deﬁcit to GDP ratio equal to 3 percent. At the beginning of every year, government
sets concurrently the level of corporate tax, Value-added tax and labour tax according to the current level of deﬁcit to GDP
ratio. Three cases are possible:
1. If the ratio is higher than 3 percent tax rates are increased by 5 percent.
2. If the ratio is negative, i.e. government incomes are higher than expenditures, tax rates are decreased by 5 percent.
3. If the ratio is included between 0 and 3 percent, tax rates remain unchanged.
3.2. Fiscal compact (FC)
The policy target set in FC scenario is given by a level of debt to GDP ratio equal to 60 percent. At the beginning of
every year, government computes the ratio between debt, that corresponds to the value of the outstanding bonds, and GDP.
Depending on the level of debt to GDP ratio compared to the target, two  main cases are possible:
1. If debt to GDP ratio is lower than 60 percent, tax rates are set according to the following rule:
• If deﬁcit to GDP ratio is greater than 0, tax rates are increased by 5 percent.
• If deﬁcit to GDP ratio is lower than 0, tax rates are decreased by 5 percent.
2. If debt to GDP ratio is higher than 60 percent, government computes the twentieth part of the value exceeding the
threshold, i.e.
ET = (Debt/GDP)  − 0.6
20
In terms of ﬁscal policy, the effects are twofold:
• Tax rates are increased by 5 percent if the deﬁcit to GDP ratio is greater than ET and decreased otherwise.
• Government repurchases bonds in the secondary market for a value equal to ET if its payment account is positive.
In the following, we provide the details about the implementation of the three additional policy speciﬁcations:
3.3. Unemployment escape clause (U)
At beginning of the year, if the average unemployment rate of the previous year or the current unemployment rate is
greater than 10 percent, unemployment escape clause is activated and tax rates are left unchanged despite the level of deﬁcit
to GDP ratio and the debt to GDP ratio in SGP and FC basis scenarios, respectively.
3.4. Quantitative easing (QE)
The quantitative easing mechanism is modelled by allowing the central bank to buy government bonds in the ﬁnancial
market. This mechanism activates on the top of the standard Taylor rule, which sets the policy rate. QE is activated when
the current unemployment rate is higher than 10 percent. The quantity of bonds to be purchased daily is set as:
nG/10
240
i.e., the 10 percent of the total outstanding bonds nG. The quantity is computed on daily basis, being 240 the number of days
in a year, because the central bank enters the bonds market every day, in order to smooth the purchase across one year.
3.5. Fiscal accommodation (FA)Please cite this article in press as: Teglio, A., et al., Budgetary rigour with stimulus in lean times: Policy advices from an
agent-based model. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.016
Fiscal accommodation is activated on a monthly basis, if the current unemployment rate exceeds the threshold of 10
percent. Being a monthly policy, tax rates decreases are computed as the twelfth part of the yearly tax rates changes, set to
5 percent.
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. Simulation results
One of the most relevant features of the Eurace model is the emergence of endogenous business cycles and crises,
epending on boom-bust credit cycles. The mechanisms of generation and propagation of such crises have been discussed
n previous papers, see e.g. Cincotti et al. (2010), Raberto et al. (2012) or Teglio et al. (2012), and we will recall them when
eeded. In this section we discuss the effectiveness of the different ﬁscal and monetary policies, outlined in Section 3, in
reventing or mitigating the endogenous economic crises arising in the Eurace model.
The methodology of our study is based on Monte Carlo computational experiments, consisting in running simulations
ith different seeds of the pseudorandom number generator for each policy scenario. We  consider eight policy scenarios,
s explained in Section 3, and ﬁfty seeds per scenario, for a total of four hundred simulations. Simulations are performed
eteris paribus, meaning that all the parameters of the economic system are identical across the different policy scenarios,
ith the exception of the speciﬁc parameters characterizing the policy scenario. Simulations run for a time span of twenty
ve years but they are indistinguishable during the ﬁrst nine years, when every case runs under the stability and growth
act policy (SGP). Simulations are allowed to diverge at the beginning of year nine, when the distinction among the different
olicies is enabled. In this way, simulations have a common transition phase, which we  discard in the analysis, and a second
ifferentiated period that originates from the same initial conditions. Therefore, for every given seed, divergence among
imulated time series is caused only by the different policy settings.
The presentation of results is organized to show both the performance of the different policies during crisis periods and
he overall performance of each policy during the entire time span. On the one hand, we  focus the attention on what happens
uring a crisis and why some policies perform better than others; on the other hand, we want to show the behaviour of
ome crucial variables (e.g., public budget related variables) in the long run.
Simulations have been performed with the following settings: 5000 Households, 100 Consumption Goods Producers, 5
anks, 1 Capital Good Producer, 1 Government and 1 Central Bank.
In the following sections, results are presented from a qualitative and quantitative point of view, with the intention
o examine and disclose the economic mechanisms that explain the obtained results. For every policy scenario, several
ables report the ensemble averages of many relevant economic variables. Ensemble averages have been computed over the
ifferent seeds of the pseudo-random number generator; the relatively low standard errors, as reported within brackets in
he tables, indicate that the ensemble averages provide reliable indications and that increasing further the number of seeds
ould not provide new meaningful information.
.1. Genesis of a crisis
The Eurace model is characterized by endogenous business cycles and endogenous crises, as described for instance in
aberto et al. (2012). Gross domestic product shows three stylized behaviours: a trend growth, alternate periods of growth
nd recession (business cycles), and sudden output falls that are usually followed by subsequent recoveries.
The underlying rate of GDP growth is given by capital accumulation by ﬁrms. Change in technology and human capital
re not considered in this work, as our focus is on the short and medium run out-of-equilibrium dynamics, when ﬁrms are
ndowed with an amount of physical capital that can be increased. We  are not interested here in the hypothetical steady
tate where ﬁrms invest only to replace depreciated capital. The origin of a typical crisis in the model can be summarized
s follows. When the economy is in a boom period, characterized by high growth rate and nearly full employment, the
ncrement of unit costs, due to the strong pressure on wages, as well as high aggregated demand, causes an increase in the
evel of prices. Consequently, the central bank inﬂation targeting policy rule raises the base interest rate, increasing interest
ayments by ﬁrms. Fig. 1 illustrates this mechanism for a representative simulation8 of the model, for 4 selected policies.
ig. 2 shows that the economic boom is driven by a credit expansion starting at year 9, slowing down in the second half
f the 11th year, and growing again during year 12. Let us focus now on the ﬁscal compact scenario (FC) (we will compare
he different policies later). Fig. 3 shows a double dip recession starting in the second half of the 11th year and becoming a
evere crisis at the beginning of year 13, after a temporary phase of economic recovery.
During the inﬂation of the credit bubble, the ﬁnancial stability of the economic system is signiﬁcantly weakened; ﬁrms’
nancial indicators deteriorate (see Fig. 4). The interest bill paid by ﬁrms becomes very high with respect to revenues, causing
n increasing insolvency risk for ﬁrms. The bubble burst is actually triggered by insolvency bankruptcies of ﬁrms that are
arge enough to hurt banks’ equity, see Figs.9 6 and 2 (top panel). In turn, banks’ equity contraction, due to the minimumPlease cite this article in press as: Teglio, A., et al., Budgetary rigour with stimulus in lean times: Policy advices from an
agent-based model. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.016
apital requirements regulatory provisions, causes a credit crunch that affects ﬁrms’ possibilities to reﬁnance their debt,
hus leading to a vicious cycle that severely hits economic activity through illiquidity bankruptcy chains, see Fig. 5.
8 The representative simulation is given by a particular choice of the seed of the pseudo-random number generator. The four policy scenarios represented
n  the ﬁgures obviously refer to the same seed.
9 Note that we are still focusing only on the ﬁscal compact case, i.e. the continuous black line.
Please cite this article in press as: Teglio, A., et al., Budgetary rigour with stimulus in lean times: Policy advices from an
agent-based model. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.016
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Fig. 1. Monthly consumption good price (top panel), wage level (middle panel) and central bank interest rate (bottom panel) for four different ﬁscal and
monetary policy scenarios.
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Fig. 2. Monthly banks’ equity (top panel) and banks’ loans (bottom panel) for four different ﬁscal and monetary policy scenarios.
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Fig. 3. Monthly unemployment rate (top panel) and sales (bottom panel) for four different ﬁscal and monetary policy scenarios.
Please cite this article in press as: Teglio, A., et al., Budgetary rigour with stimulus in lean times: Policy advices from an
agent-based model. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.016
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Fig. 4. Monthly ﬁrms’ debt to equity ratio (top panel) and interests to revenues ratio (bottom panel) for four different ﬁscal and monetary policy scenarios.
Fig. 5. Monthly number of illiquidity bankruptcies for four different ﬁscal and monetary policy scenarios.
Fig. 6. Monthly number of insolvency bankruptcies for four different ﬁscal and monetary policy scenarios.
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Table 4
Fiscal policy and public accounts: yearly statistics (%).
FC SGP U QE FA Tax rates Debt/GDP Deﬁcit/GDP Bond yield
√
22.22 (0.40) 99 (3) 1.21 (0.44) 8.40 (0.27)√  √
20.29 (0.37) 110 (4) 3.23 (0.46) 9.33 (0.39)√  √ √
21.03 (0.32) 105 (4) 2.11 (0.45) 8.42 (0.32)√ √ √ √
19.64 (0.30) 121 (7) 4.27 (0.58) 9.44 (0.46)√
20.22 (0.34) 117 (6) 2.85 (0.33) 12.42 (0.45)√ √
18.74 (0.32) 140 (8) 5.07 (0.41) 15.02 (0.74)√ √ √
19.48 (0.28) 131 (7) 3.77 (0.39) 13.19 (0.54)√  √ √ √
18.29 (0.30) 163 (11) 6.92 (0.58) 14.41 (0.70)Fig. 7. Monthly tax bill/GDP (top panel) and tax rates (bottom panel) for four different ﬁscal and monetary policy scenarios.
4.2. Dealing with the crisis: a comparison of ﬁscal policies
In Section 3 we presented the set of eight policies we  are considering in the model. Two ﬁscal policies, called “ﬁscal
compact” (FC) and “stability and growth pact” (SGP), are used as standard scenarios. SGP means targeting a 3% deﬁcit over
GDP ratio, whereas FC adds the constraint on government debt, which should not exceed 60% of GDP. Moreover, the standard
scenarios are incrementally enriched with three complementary policies which relax ﬁscal rigidity. The ﬁrst policy is the
“unemployment escape clause” (U), stating that while the unemployment rate is above a given threshold of 10%, budget
constraints on public deﬁcit and debt are suspended. In the second complementary policy, the central bank is allowed to buy
government bonds in the secondary market (QE). Finally, the “ﬁscal accommodation” policy (FA) adds a tax rate reduction
to the U + QE policy.
As a result we have eight different policy combinations, which are reported in the left side of our tables (see for instance
Table 4). On the other hand, time series plots present only four of the eight total policies. This choice is motivated by a
readability issue and by the fact that plots are mainly intended to visualize and interpret the economic mechanisms that
lead to the aggregated results presented in the tables. The four policies shown in the time series plots are the basic ones of
FC “ﬁscal compact” and SGP “stability and growth pact”, along with their most expansionary versions, i.e. characterized by
the addition of the unemployment escape clause (U), quantitative easing (QE), and ﬁscal accommodation (FA). The rationale
here is to show the “extreme” cases, remanding to the tables for the intermediate ones.
Before the discussion on the effects of ﬁscal policy, let us brieﬂy resume the main mechanisms through which taxation
affects spending patterns and agents’ behaviours in the model. Increasing the tax rate on households’ labour and capital
income affects the available net income, as in Eq. (A.13), therefore decreasing consumption and aggregate demand. Eq.
(A.14) shows that consumption follows a buffer stock saving rule that targets a ﬁxed wealth-to-income ratio. Taxes on ﬁrms’
corporate earning decrease ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial resources, forcing them to resort to borrowing money from banks or issuing new
stocks. The value-added tax raises the market price of ﬁnal goods, decreasing the real demand of goods by households in
the short run, with non-trivial effects in the medium run. Finally, higher corporate taxes for both ﬁrms and banks generally
decrease households’ dividends, and then households’ disposable income through the capital income channel.
Let us focus on the crisis that goes from the second half of year 11 to the end of year 13. Fig. 3 clearly shows that coun-Please cite this article in press as: Teglio, A., et al., Budgetary rigour with stimulus in lean times: Policy advices from an
agent-based model. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.016
terbalancing a strict ﬁscal policy during recessions is crucial in order to avoid severe crises. In the case of the expansionary
versions of the two basic policies, the deep crisis of year 13 is prevented. Fig. 7 shows how the government avoids raising
taxes in order to fulﬁl its budget commitments. Tax rates are kept low and the tax bill over GDP also remains low. How-
ever, looking at Fig. 8 showing the yearly government budget and deﬁcit over GDP, it emerges that deﬁcit and debt do not
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igniﬁcantly increase during the crisis. This is true in particular for the case of the expansionary version of the ﬁscal compact
when a strict ﬁscal compact scenario is relaxed during high unemployment periods). The main point suggested here is
hat, during a crisis, the potential loss in GDP caused by a rigid “austerity” policy is higher than the raise in deﬁcit or debt
aused by the temporary relaxing of such rigid measures. In other words it suggests that the ﬁscal multiplier is sufﬁciently
igh during recessions to recommend expansionary policies stimulating aggregate demand. Fig. 1 shows that, during the
risis, the interest rate is very similar among all policy scenarios. Actually, the monetary policy is set by the Taylor rule in
ll cases and, when unemployment starts growing, the central bank decreases the interest rate to foster new investments.
evertheless, if we observe banks and ﬁrms data in Figs. 2 and 4, we  see remarkable differences. The deleveraging process
haracterized by both a sudden reduction of ﬁrms’ debt and a crash of banks’ equity is clearly reduced in the case of ﬁscal
timulus. Sustaining aggregate demand during the crisis has a chain of positive effects in the short-medium run; ﬁrst, it
revents sales crush, supporting ﬁrms’ cash ﬂows and their internal ﬁnancing, thus decreasing bankruptcies risk; then, it
efends banks from the swift equity losses caused by bankruptcies, allowing them to continue lending also after year 13.
n the contrary, it is interesting to notice the long lasting negative effect on lending caused by strict ﬁscal policies in Fig. 2,
here (for FC and SGP policy scenarios) loans are strongly reduced and go back to pre-crisis levels only after almost ﬁve
ears (year 18). This is due to a vicious cycle where banks are not able to lend and to make enough proﬁts to increase their
quity capital (by retaining earnings). Furthermore, Basel II regulation does not allow banks with low equity capital to lend
nd therefore to improve their ﬁnancial statement, leading to a long lasting stalemate in the economy.
.3. Fiscal scenarios from a wider perspective
Results presented in the previous section convey a clear message: relaxing ﬁscal policy during a crisis is beneﬁcial for the
conomy. The government should have as a primary objective during a crisis the reduction of unemployment by sustaining
ggregate demand. Both in the case of “ﬁscal compact” and “stability and growth pact” regimes, a ﬁscal expansion has a
ositive impact during a crisis. This is what we observe in our results and what has been illustrated in some representative
gures. Of course, we need also to consider the other side of the coin, by looking at public accounts.
Moreover, we need to generalize our results showing some robustness across the stochastic shocks to the model, or more
recisely the different seeds used to simulate it. In this regard, we present a set of tables showing the ensemble averages of
everal economic indicators, computed over ﬁfty different seeds. We  also report in Figs. 10 and 11 the boxplots of some of
he main variables presented in the tables.
The tables consider the complete set of the eight scenarios and allow us for some more detailed comments on the
ncremental design of policy strategies. In this respect, having many scenarios to compare, let us brieﬂy outline a general
iscussion frame. The ﬁrst comparison should be between “stability and growth pact” (SGP) and “ﬁscal compact” (FC),
.e., between a pure deﬁcit targeting constraint and a stricter one involving also debt restrictions. Then, we consider the
umulative effect of the additional policies introduced in the previous sections, i.e., “unemployment escape clause” (U),
quantitative easing” (QE) and “ﬁscal accommodation” (FA). Furthermore, we will present and analyze both the outcomesPlease cite this article in press as: Teglio, A., et al., Budgetary rigour with stimulus in lean times: Policy advices from an
agent-based model. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.016
f the model obtained from the entire simulation time span and the speciﬁc results concerning periods of crisis.
Tables 5 and 6 show the ensemble average values of some indicators characterizing periods of crisis. In particular they
how the average number of occurrences of at least two consecutive months with unemployment higher than10 10% (Table 5)
10 We use this condition as a proxy of a crisis.
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Fig. 9. Inverse cumulative distribution of ﬁrms’ bankruptcies during a bimester.Fig. 10. Boxplot and mean of real consumption (top-left panel), real GDP (top-right panel), real wage growth rate (middle-left panel), unemployment rate
(middle-right panel), real capital stock growth rate (bottom-left panel), inﬂation rate (bottom-right panel) for four different ﬁscal and monetary policy
scenarios.
or 20% (Table 6). The two tables also show the average duration of a crisis, measured in consecutive months, and the
probability for a ﬁrm to go bankrupt during this period. Finally, the maximum unemployment rate during the crisis period
is shown.
Furthermore, Fig. 9 shows the inverse cumulative distribution function of bankruptcies during a bimester for differentPlease cite this article in press as: Teglio, A., et al., Budgetary rigour with stimulus in lean times: Policy advices from an
agent-based model. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.016
policy scenarios (considering all seeds). It has to be read as the probability of having more that a given number of bankruptcies
during two consecutive months. Results clearly suggest that, when no ﬁscal relief mechanism is applied during crises,
bankruptcies are more likely to happen and the economy is more unstable.
Please cite this article in press as: Teglio, A., et al., Budgetary rigour with stimulus in lean times: Policy advices from an
agent-based model. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.016
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Fig. 11. Boxplot and mean of tax rate (top-left panel), government bond yield (top-right panel), inﬂation rate (middle-left panel), CB rate (middle-right
panel), deﬁcit to GDP ratio (bottom-left panel), debt to GDP ratio (bottom-right panel) for four different ﬁscal and monetary policy scenarios.
Table 5
Crisis analysis. # Depressions is the number of episodes with, at least, two consecutive months where unemployment rate is higher than 10%. Duration is
the  average number of months that characterize depressions. Bankruptcy prob.(%) represents ﬁrms’ bankruptcy probability during depressions.
FC SGP U QE FA # Depressions Duration Bankruptcy prob.(%)
√
1.6 (0.2) 18.7 (1.4) 39.64 (5.73)√  √
1.2 (0.2) 15.4 (0.8) 19.86 (4.40)√ √  √
1.3 (0.1) 14.8 (0.9) 29.16 (5.20)√ √  √ √
0.9 (0.1) 12.9 (0.7) 22.28 (4.44)√
1.0 (0.1) 14.0 (1.5) 25.18 (4.61)√  √
0.9 (0.1) 14.0 (0.9) 18.32 (3.60)√  √ √
1.0 (0.1) 14.1 (1.0) 23.02 (5.01)√ √  √ √
0.9 (0.1) 12.8 (0.8) 22.68 (5.31)
Table 6
Crisis analysis. # Depressions is the number of episodes with, at least, two consecutive months where unemployment rate is higher than 20%. Duration
is  the average number of months that characterize depressions. Bankruptcy prob.(%) represents ﬁrms’ bankruptcy probability during depressions. Max
unemployment represents the unemployment rate peak for each scenario.
FC SGP U QE FA # Depression Duration Bankruptcy prob.(%) Max  unempl.
√
0.8 (0.1) 9.5 (0.6) 33.78 (5.56) 39.57 (2.17)√  √
0.5 (0.1) 8.0 (0.6) 15.76 (4.10) 33.55 (1.75)√ √  √
0.4 (0.1) 8.8 (0.5) 21.30 (4.72) 35.11 (1.95)√  √ √ √
0.3 (0.1) 6.9 (0.4) 14.12 (4.17) 31.13 (1.20)√
0.5 (0.1) 9.4 (0.5) 19.98 (4.36) 33.69 (1.83)√ √
0.5 (0.1) 8.9 (0.6) 11.42 (3.04) 29.37 (0.91)√ √ √
0.5 (0.1) 8.2 (0.5) 15.00 (4.07) 32.10 (1.60)√  √ √ √
0.3 (0.1) 7.0 (0.5) 17.02 (4.65) 31.87 (1.71)
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Table 7
Prices: yearly growth rates (%) and central bank rate (%).
FC SGP U QE FA Money wage Price Real wage CB rate
√
6.47 (0.21) 4.01 (0.20) 1.94 (0.12) 3.48 (0.15)√  √
6.90 (0.17) 4.44 (0.19) 2.17 (0.09) 3.71 (0.16)√  √ √
6.81 (0.15) 4.26 (0.20) 2.18 (0.10) 3.73 (0.14)√ √ √ √
7.24 (0.10) 4.63 (0.16) 2.35 (0.11) 4.03 (0.13)√
7.14 (0.16) 4.64 (0.19) 2.17 (0.12) 3.72 (0.12)√ √
7.28 (0.14) 4.79 (0.15) 2.26 (0.12) 3.96 (0.13)√ √ √
7.29 (0.12) 4.95 (0.17) 2.02 (0.10) 3.93 (0.11)√  √ √ √
7.35 (0.11) 4.68 (0.16) 2.42 (0.11) 4.23 (0.13)
Table 8
Real variables yearly growth rates (%).
FC SGP U QE FA Consumption GDP Unemployment Capital stock
√
1.71 (0.13) 2.19 (0.18) 5.57 (0.29) 8.43 (0.19)√  √
2.03 (0.10) 2.73 (0.15) 4.60 (0.20) 8.71 (0.16)√  √ √
2.04 (0.09) 2.63 (0.16) 4.64 (0.21) 8.66 (0.16)√  √ √ √
2.08 (0.10) 2.86 (0.15) 4.06 (0.19) 8.85 (0.14)√
2.12 (0.10) 2.83 (0.13) 4.33 (0.25) 9.07 (0.18)√  √
2.16 (0.08) 2.95 (0.10) 3.90 (0.18) 9.10 (0.17)√  √ √
1.95 (0.09) 2.75 (0.14) 4.30 (0.21) 9.06 (0.17)√  √ √ √
2.11 (0.10) 2.88 (0.14) 3.99 (0.21) 8.88 (0.17)
Table 9
Credit variables yearly growth rates (%).
FC SGP U QE FA Loans Deposits Equity
√
5.73 (0.38) 4.41 (0.43) 4.97 (0.08)√  √
6.84 (0.32) 6.12 (0.34) 6.38 (0.07)√  √ √
6.40 (0.33) 5.55 (0.36) 5.78 (0.07)√  √ √ √
7.05 (0.21) 6.80 (0.22) 6.44 (0.04)√
7.27 (0.31) 6.61 (0.37) 7.00 (0.06)√  √
7.66 (0.23) 7.50 (0.25) 7.37 (0.06)√  √ √
7.63 (0.27) 7.28 (0.25) 7.21 (0.06)√  √ √ √
7.28 (0.24) 7.65 (0.23) 6.91 (0.06)
With a pure “ﬁscal compact” strategy the probability of having a very severe crisis, i.e., characterized by unemployment
higher than 20 % during a simulation, is 80% (see Table 6) and the average duration of the crisis is nine month and a half.
The bankruptcy probability for a ﬁrm is 33% and the maximum unemployment rate is almost 40% during the crisis. The
situation with a pure “stability and growth pact” strategy is less catastrophic but still severe, with a 50% crisis probability
per simulation and a 20% bankruptcy probability for a ﬁrm during a crisis. On the other hand, the beneﬁcial effect of relaxing
the ﬁscal constraint during crises appears quite distinctly from the data. In particular, in the FC case, when we simply allow
for the unemployment escape clause, all the crisis indicators perform much better. Similar results hold for the SGP case both
in Tables 5 and 6.
Going more into the detail, the activation of the unemployment escape clause, which rescinds the ﬁscal constraint above
a given threshold of unemployment rate, has always a positive effect on the economy during crises, as Tables 5 and 6 clearly
show. Concerning the overall economic performance, the general macroeconomic indicators are also notably improved by
activating the escape clause, as shown in Table 8. This is of course related to the higher stability of the economic system
during crises, which allows for a better performance of the economy. This higher stability of the economy allows for an
increased effectiveness of the credit sector, which is able to provide more credit to ﬁrms, as already shown in Fig. 2, and
conﬁrmed in Table 9. The countercyclical policies improve therefore both the credit provision and the equity of the banking
sector (Table 9). As expected, looking at public ﬁnances in Table 4, we  observe both in the FC+U and SGP+U cases an increase
both in public debt and deﬁcit over GDP and in the bond yield. However, over 25 years, public ﬁnances do not seem to be
under strain, especially in the FC+U case, where deﬁcit is around 3% of the GDP and debt is at 110%.
The next incremental policy step concerns the introduction of the quantitative easing mechanism. In the QE case, when
the unemployment escape clause is activated, the central bank is allowed to buy government bonds in the secondary market.
QE has a positive effect in keeping low the government bond yield, due to central bank’s demand for bonds, and in slightly
improving public ﬁnances. The level of prices is scarcely affected, probably because QE is activated only during crises when
the unemployment rate is high, wages do not raise, and ﬁrms have room to increase production by hiring new workers withPlease cite this article in press as: Teglio, A., et al., Budgetary rigour with stimulus in lean times: Policy advices from an
agent-based model. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.016
little effect on wages and prices (Table 7). However, the QE monetary expansion does not help the economy in a substantial
way. Both during crises and during the overall 25 years of simulation, all economic indicators get marginally worse. Both in
case of FC and SGP with QE, bankruptcy probability and maximum unemployment rate raise during crisis periods, and the
average 25 years GDP growth also declines with respect to the unemployment escape clause case.
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The slightly poorer economic performance of quantitative easing improves substantially when coupled with a reduction
f taxes during high unemployment periods. This scenario is represented in the tables by activating the ﬁscal accommodation
ption FA. The combination of QE and FA seems to give good results, especially in the case of an underlying ﬁscal compact
cenario (FC). The average number of crises during the simulation time span drops consistently (below 1 in Table 5 and
round 0.3 in Table 6, with both the underlying FC and SGP cases), as it does the average duration of the crisis, showing the
inimum values both under FC and SGP. The long-run economic indicators are also very good in both cases, showing a low
nemployment rate combined with a high GDP growth rate (Table 8). Government data show of course a drastic decrease
n the overall tax rate, due to reduction of ﬁscal pressure during crisis periods, along with a deterioration of government
nances. Comparing the two ﬁscal regimes of FC and SGP, the state of public accounts seems more sustainable in case of ﬁscal
ompact, where deﬁcit is 4.27% of the GDP and debt is slightly higher that 120%. On the other hand, when the underlying
GP ﬁscal regime is adopted, public accounts reach a more critical level with debt over 160% and deﬁcit close to 7% of the
DP.
. Concluding remarks
This paper investigates the effects of different ﬁscal and monetary policy combinations by simulating an evolutionary
gent-based economy. Particular attention is devoted to the study of the economy on the edge of a crisis, in order to
nderstand the policy mixture that can be more helpful both in the short run, to overcome the crisis, and in the long
un, to have a sustainable growth path and debt.
For this purpose we considered two base policies whose aim is to keep public budget under control (i.e., ﬁscal compact
nd stability and growth pact), integrating them with ﬁscal and monetary stimulus during recessions. Our results show that
argeting debt or deﬁcit over GDP ratios, irrespective of the existing economic conditions, leads to very poor outcomes and
igh instability. Expansionary ﬁscal policies during recessions are very helpful to reduce both the number and the duration
f crises. Therefore we ﬁnd that counter-cyclical ﬁscal policies, supported by adequate monetary policies, are recommended
n order to enhance growth and stability. The rationale behind these results is the need to counterbalance credit driven
usiness cycles which can lead to boom and bust dynamics if neglected. These results are in line with the Keynesian lesson,
mphasizing the importance of government intervention during recessions to stimulate aggregate demand.
The policy recommendation, embedded in the current economic debate, is therefore to keep under control public and
rivate debt during goods times, acting with counter-cyclical and macro-prudential policies (see also Teglio et al. (2012)
bout the key role of private debt regulation). This is the main way  to prevent an excessive leverage with potential instability
nd bubbles. Besides, expansionary ﬁscal policy and monetary accommodation should be vigorously used during bad times
n order to offset the loss in unemployment and aggregate demand. It’s worth remarking that the duality of this policy is
mportant because budgetary rigour during good times will help to avoid the explosion of public debt which could hurt the
conomy in the long run.
Finally, we would like to mention the model enrichments we  are currently developing. First, the inclusion of a housing
arket with bail-in bail-out mechanism for defaulting banks. Second, the addition of more sophisticated and realistic ﬁnan-
ial instruments mimicking the securitization mechanism. Third, a multi-country environment with different institutional
rchitectures.
cknowledgments
The authors acknowledge EU-FP7 collaborative project SYMPHONY11 under Grant No. 611875. Andrea Teglio also
cknowledges project ECO2015-68469-R funded by the Spanish Ministry of Research.
ppendix A. The model
Eurace agents
In the appendix, we describe in details agents’ decision making and interactions through different market settings. Agents’
tate variables are the balance sheet entries described in Table 1; in the following, we  report the equations characterizing
gents’ behaviour and decision making. Agents’ formation of expected values, wishes or plans about key economic variables
re also reported and denoted with the superscript e, while wishes or plan are marked by an hat on the variable symbol.
ables A.10–A.14 include agents’ parameters set for the simulations’ initialization, used to produce the presented results.
Scheduling
The elementary simulation time step can be considered a calendar day; however, most agents’ decisions and economicPlease cite this article in press as: Teglio, A., et al., Budgetary rigour with stimulus in lean times: Policy advices from an
agent-based model. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.016
vents occur at a weekly, monthly, or even yearly periodicity, and are asynchronous. For instance, trading of stocks and
overnment bonds is active every day; consumption budget decisions are made monthly by households but purchases
re made on weekly basis; ﬁrms’ decision about production planning, new hirings, pricing, investments and ﬁnancing are
11 www.projectsymphony.eu.
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Table A.10
Firm parameters
Symbol Name Value
 Previous month production weight 0.5
  Total factor productivity 1.5
˛  Output elasticities of labor 0.662
ˇ  Output elasticities of capital 0.338
K Capital goods constant monthly depreciation rate 0.005
w Monthly wage percentage increase 0.01
C Fixed mark up 0.1
d Fraction of net earnings paid as dividends 0.75
ω	 Central bank inﬂation target weight 0.5
Table A.11
Bank parameters
Symbol Name Value
  Capital adequacy ratio 0.10
T
 Loan duration (months) 24
ı
 Monthly fraction of debt repayment 1/T

Table A.12
Household parameters
Symbol Name Value
C Adjustment speed of consumption 0.01
C Target ratio of liquid wealth to net income 70
	H Probability of ﬁnancial asset portfolio allocation 0.1
ıw Constant rate of reservation wage decrease 0.01
Table A.13
Central bank parameters
Symbol Name Value
r* Assumed real interest rate 0.02
	ˆC Inﬂation target 0.02
ˆN Unemployment target 0.0
ω	 Inﬂation weight 0.2
ω Unemployment weight 0.2
Table A.14
Government parameters
Symbol Name Value
rG Fixed nominal yearly rate on bonds 0.02
ıU Fraction of last wage setting the unemployment beneﬁt 0.7
ıT Fraction of the average wage level setting the transfer payment 0.5
ıG Fraction of public employees among household population 0.2
characterized by a monthly periodicity but are asynchronous, i.e., each ﬁrm makes its monthly production/investments
decisions at a particular day, henceforth activation day, of the calendar month.12
Finally, decisions by policy makers can be taken on a monthly or yearly basis. In particular, the policy rate is set by the
central bank at the beginning of each calendar month, at the same time the government sets the amount of bonds to issuePlease cite this article in press as: Teglio, A., et al., Budgetary rigour with stimulus in lean times: Policy advices from an
agent-based model. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.016
during the month to address its liquidity needs; tax rates instead are usually adjusted on a yearly basis according to the
predeﬁned ﬁscal policy.
Consumption goods producers (ﬁrms)
12 A calendar month is deﬁned as a set of 20 days.
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We  provide below a sequential list of the key decision variables each consumption goods producer, henceforth ﬁrm f,
lans or decides once a month, at its particular activation day:
the expected demand of consumption goods qeCf it will face, based on a linear interpolation of past TC monthly sales;
the desired level of inventories Iˆf to meet expected demand qeCf ;
the production needs qCf necessary to accumulate the desired level of inventories Iˆf , i.e., qCf = max[0, Iˆf − If ];
the production plan qˆCf as a linear combination
13 of production needs qCf and previous month production qCf , i.e., qˆCf =
(1 − )qCf + qCf ;
the labor force Nˆf needed and the amount of physical capital Kˆf needed to meet the desired production plan, given the
present endowment of capital goods Kf, the present number of employees Nf, and the Cobb-Douglas production technology,
as follows:
Nˆf =
(
qˆCf
(Kf )
ˇ
)1/˛
; (A.1)
Kˆf =
(
qˆCf
(Nf )
˛
)1/ˇ
; (A.2)
where  is the total factor productivity, while  ˛ and  ˇ are the output elasticities of labor and capital, respectively;
the labor demand Nd
f
given by the difference, if not negative, between the needed labor force Nˆf and the present number
of employees Nf;
the planned investment in new capital goods ˆKf , which is bounded by the difference Kˆf − Kf and maximizes the present
value of the foreseen additional revenues peCmmqCf , originated by the investment at any next month m,  after deducting
the investment costs at the capital goods price pK, as follows:
ˆKf = arg max
ˆKf ≤(Kˆf−Kf )
⎛
⎜⎝−pKˆKf +∑
m
peCmmqCf
(1 + C )
(
1 +
rKf
12
)m
⎞
⎟⎠ ; (A.3)
where C is the value added tax on consumption, peCm is the expected price level at any future month m and mqCf is the
additional output given by the planned investment. The latter two  quantities are estimated as follows:
peCm = pC
(
1 + 	
e
C
12
)m
; (A.4)
mqCf = N˛f (Kf + (1 − K )
mˆKf )
ˇ − N˛f K
ˇ
f
; (A.5)
where 	eC is the expected yearly inﬂation rate
14 and K is the capital goods constant monthly depreciation rate.15 Finally,
rKf is the yearly average cost of capital of ﬁrm f; for the sake of simplicity, this cost is estimated by averaging the cost
of different loans. It is worth commenting the asymmetry in the way demand for capital and labour is determined. In
particular, labour demand fully depends on the one-step forward expected demand of consumption goods, see Eq. (A.1);
on the contrary, expected sales matter only to set the maximum bound for the desired capital endowment of the ﬁrm, given
the present level of employment, see Eq. (A.1). Given this bound, investment demand is determined by the discounted
long-term expected cash ﬂows (see Eq. (A.3)) and takes into account the capital goods price as well as ﬁnancing costs.
This sort of asymmetry in input demand determination has been modeled to take into account the different way  the two
production inputs are usually managed by ﬁrms in reality, and accordingly in Eurace. In particular, labour can be considered
as a ﬂow variable for the ﬁrm, whereas physical capital is a stock variable and indeed is one of the balance sheet entries of
the ﬁrm. In more practical terms, the ﬁrm is usually able to change its labour input quite easily; in particular, ﬁrms can ﬁre
employees at no cost and are able to hire new workers without particular difﬁculty considering the usual unemploymentPlease cite this article in press as: Teglio, A., et al., Budgetary rigour with stimulus in lean times: Policy advices from an
agent-based model. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.016
levels. On the contrary, capital goods when acquired by a ﬁrm become specialized to the ﬁrm itself and cannot be resold
to other producers. In other terms, investment is irreversible and, even if in principle ﬁrms could not fully employ their
plants (but this possibility is not considered in our model), the full cost of cumulated investments is still borne by ﬁrm’s
13 This provision is aimed to smooth the production plan over time and then reduce oscillations in input demand.
14 Expected inﬂation 	e
C
is estimated as a weighted average between the declared central bank inﬂation target 	ˆCB and the present yearly realized inﬂation
ate  	C , i.e., 	e = ω		ˆCB + (1 − ω	)	C , where the weight parameter ω	 can be considered as a sort of trust of private agents on the central bank policy
ction.
15 Due to capital depreciation, the cash ﬂows given by the additional revenues of investments decrease exponentially over time and therefore the sum of
q.  (A.3) is truncated when the addend is lower than a positive very small threshold.
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ﬁnances. These considerations are the rationale that supports setting labour demand, i.e. demand for a ﬂexible input, based
on short-term sales expectations, and setting capital goods demand, i.e. demand for irreversible investments, based on
the cost opportunity of capital, yet with the limit determined by expected sales.
• the total liquidity needs Mˆf given by the foreseen cost of planned capital goods investments pKˆKf , planned labor costs
wf Nˆf , debt interests If and the installment ıDDf of debt repayment, taxes16 Tf and the foreseen dividend payout nEf df , i.e.,
Mˆf = pKˆKf + wNˆf + If + ı
Df + Tf + nEf df ; (A.6)
where ı
 is the monthly fraction of debt repayment17 and, considering the yearly interest rate rf,bi paid by ﬁrm f on its ith
debt of amount Df,bi to bank b, monthly debt interests payments are given by: If =
∑
b,i
rf,bi
12 Df,bi ;
• the amount of new loan 
ˆf requested to the banking system, given by the difference, if not negative, between Mˆf and
present liquidity Mf;
• if rationed in the credit market, i.e., the new loan 
f received is lower than 
ˆf , the amount of new shares nEf to issue in
the stock market, given by:
nEf =
Mˆf − 
f − Mf
pEf
; (A.7)
where pEf is the present stock price;
• if rationed also in the stock market, the reduction of the costs under its control, in order to make the total ﬁnancial needs
consistent with the available liquidity. First, the total dividend payout is reduced up to zero, then, if still not sufﬁcient, the
investment plan is sized down and, eventually, the production plan as well.18
As soon as the decisions above are taken, the ﬁrm pays its ﬁnancial commitments, namely, debt interests and debt install-
ments, taxes on corporate earnings, the value added tax and dividends to shareholders. Then, in the same activation day, the
ﬁrm enters factors (labor and capital goods) markets to fulﬁll its production and investment plans, also considering possible
revisions downward due to rationing in the credit and stock markets. In particular, if the number of employees is higher than
needed, the ﬁrm ﬁres workers in excess, otherwise it starts the ﬁrst labor market session to hire new additional employees.
If the ﬁrm is unable to hire all the needed new employees, it increases its wage offer by a ﬁxed percentage w and starts a
second market session. If rationed again, it increases again its wage offer but exits the labor market ending up with a number
of employees Nf lower than the planned one. Monthly wages are paid in advance at the end of the labor market sessions.19
Then, the ﬁrm purchases the amount of new capital goods according to fulﬁll its investment plan. New capital goods are
immediately delivered and summed up to the existing capital endowment. We  assume that ﬁrms are never rationed in the
capital goods market. Finally, ﬁrms execute the production process that, following the Cobb-Douglas technology, delivers
immediately an amount of new consumption goods qCf given by the new levels of labor Nf and capital Kf, as follows:
qCf = N˛f K
ˇ
f
. (A.8)
The new produced goods are summed to present inventories and made available for sale to households during the 20 business
days following ﬁrms’ activation days. Finally, the new sale price pCf is set based on a ﬁxed mark-up C on the overall unit
costs cuf , i.e.,
pCf = (1 + C )cuf ; (A.9)
where overall unit costs are a weighted average of inventories’ unit costs c(I)uf and new produced goods unit costs c
(q)
uf
, given
by labor costs and the interest bill, as follows:Please cite this article in press as: Teglio, A., et al., Budgetary rigour with stimulus in lean times: Policy advices from an
agent-based model. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.016
cuf =
If c
(I)
uf
+ qCf c
(q)
uf
If + qCf
c(q)uf =
wf Nf + If
qCf
. (A.10)
16 Tf include taxes on corporate earnings and the value added tax (VAT) paid by consumers. VAT is collected by ﬁrms and transferred by them to the
government.
17 See Table A.11.
18 If the available liquidity is not even sufﬁcient to meet compulsory payments, i.e. debt service and taxes, then the ﬁrm enters a process called illiquidity
bankruptcy, where it ﬁres all its employees and stay inactive till it is able to raise the necessary funds in the stock market. It is worth remembering that the
model  foresees also a more severe case called insolvency bankruptcy, which is triggered whenever the equity of the ﬁrm becomes negative and therefore
involves also a debt restructuring process with a consequent loan and equity write-off for lending banks.
19 Further details about the Eurace labor market are provided in Dawid et al. (2014).
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fter twenty days, the day before a new activation day occurs, each ﬁrm calculates its monthly income statement along with
onthly interests, taxes and net earnings; then computes the share of dividend payout as a fraction d of net earnings, if
ositive, and updates its balance sheet.20
Capital goods producer
There is just one type of technology for capital goods. Capital goods are produced on request and therefore do not generate
nventories. Energy and raw materials are the only factor of production and are assumed to be imported from abroad. The
rice of capital goods is set according to a mark-up on input prices, which are exogenously given. Proﬁts of investment good
roducers are distributed in equal shares among all households. Thus, the amount paid by consumption goods producers for
nvestment goods is partially (the part related to mark-up) channelled back into the economy. In the experiments performed
n this study, however, in order to separate the effects of the different ﬁscal policies from the exogenous dynamics of raw
aterials and energy, the price of these commodities has been conventionally set to zero, and the price of capital goods is
et to a constant value. The model can therefore be considered as a closed economy where the revenues of the capital goods
roducer coincide with its proﬁts and are fully channelled back into Eurace economy through dividends and tax payments.
Banks
Banks are always active on a daily basis being ready to receive loans requests from ﬁrms. As outlined in the previous
aragraph, each ﬁrm sends a loan request at its activation day and ﬁrms’ activation days are uniformly distributed over the
alendar month. Whenever a bank receive a loan request 
ˆf by a ﬁrm f, the request is evaluated and a loan eventually offered
ccording to the following steps:
the bank assesses the risk of the new loan; ﬁrst, it estimates the default probability 	Df of the prospective borrower, based
on its leverage, along the lines of the Moody’s KMV model (Saunders and Allen, 2010); then, it assesses the risk weight ω

ˆf
of the new loan through an ad-hoc cubic function approximating21 the so-called Basel II internal ratings approach, i.e.,
	Df =
Df + 
ˆf
Df + 
ˆf + Ef
ω

ˆf
= 2.5(	Df )
3. (A.11)
The rationale is that the lower the capital base of the borrower with respect to its debt, the higher the likelihood of default
is, and then the loan’s risk, because of possible equity losses due to negative earnings;
the bank b checks if its risk-weighted loan portfolio including the new prospective loan, weighted by its risk, still fulﬁls
regulatory capital requirements, i.e. if the following condition holds:
Eb ≥ 
(∑
i
ω
i
i + ω
ˆf 
ˆf
)
; (A.12)
where  is the so called capital adequacy ratio, i.e. a policy parameter, ranging from 0 to 1, set by the regulatory provisions
for the banking system;
the bank b rejects the loan requests or otherwise it offers to ﬁrm f a loan amount 
b,f ≤ 
ˆf to the extent the capital
requirement condition of Eq. (A.12) is satisﬁed; the new loan is offered for a duration of T
 months at a yearly interest rate
rb,f given by central bank rate plus a stochastic mark-up depending of the loan risk ω
f .
he borrowing ﬁrm ranks the loan offers received according to their interest rates and accepts the loan offers with the lowest
ates up to the amount of money requested.
At the end of any calendar month, each bank computes its income statement along with income taxes and net earnings,
hen decides the dividends payout, to be paid each ﬁrst day of the calendar month, then updates its balance sheet. All net
arnings, if positive, are paid out as dividends, unless the bank had to decline loan requests because of the capital adequacy
atio constraint. In this case, the bank retains all net earnings to increase its equity base.
Households
Households are always ready on a daily basis to make a ﬁnancial trade and to look for a new job, if unemployed. In
articular, at any daily simulation step, each household has a given exogenously probability 	H to change the allocationPlease cite this article in press as: Teglio, A., et al., Budgetary rigour with stimulus in lean times: Policy advices from an
agent-based model. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.016
f its ﬁnancial portfolio. In this case, the household forms beliefs about the expected returns of all ﬁnancial assets (ﬁrms’
hares and government bonds) according to a weighted average of fundamentalist, random and chartist prototype expected
eturns, then she/he computes the new “optimal” asset allocation according to a preference structure based on the myopic
oss aversion hypothesis of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Benartzi and Thaler, 1995); ﬁnally, the household
20 In particular, each ﬁrm updates the value of its net worth or equity. If the equity becomes negative the ﬁrm is declared insolvent and enters a special
rocess  termed insolvency bankruptcy, where the its ﬁres all its employees, undergoes a restructuring of its debt with a related loan write-off and a
orresponding equity loss on creditor banks’ balance sheets, and stays inactive for a period of time after which it enters again the market with a healthy
alance sheet. Physical capital of insolvent ﬁrms is therefore not lost but remains inactive for a while.
21 According to the graphical representation reported in Yeh et al. (2005).
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issues buy and sell orders to get the desired optimal allocation. Full details about households’ ﬁnancial beliefs and preference
and the working of the ﬁnancial market are provided in Raberto et al. (2008b), Teglio et al. (2009).
After ﬁnancial market transactions are over, unemployed households enter the labor market to evaluate pending job
offers. Here, households are randomly queued to apply to the set of available jobs characterized by the highest wages,
provided that they are higher than their reservation wage.22 If a household is not successful in getting a new job, her/his
reservation wage is decreased by a constant rate ıw and the household re-evaluates again pending job offers. If the job
search is again unsuccessful, household’s reservation wage is again decreased by the same rate ıw and she/he leaves the
labor market till next daily simulation step. Further details about the Eurace labor market are provided in Dawid et al. (2014).
Employed households receive their salary from their employers (the ﬁrms) on a monthly basis but at different days
which coincide with ﬁrms’ activation days, i.e. the dates when they have been hired. Salaries wf are identical among the
employees of the same ﬁrm f but differ across ﬁrms, according to the labor market outcome, because ﬁrms raise their wage
offer whenever they are unable to ﬁnd the needed employees. Households employed in the public sector receive from the
government a public wage wg , which is set equal to the average wage in the private sector in the last 12 months. Unemployed
households receive on a monthly basis an unemployment beneﬁt23 from the government; the beneﬁt is paid the same day
of the month the household is ﬁred. The day of the month a households receive the salary or the unemployment beneﬁt,
it gets also a transfer payment24 yTh from the government and computes and pays taxes on both the labor income yLh (the
salary or the unemployment beneﬁt) and the capital income, given by the stocks’ dividends yEh and bonds’ coupons yBh
received during the previous 20 days. The same day the household receives its labor/unemployment beneﬁt income, it also
determines its monthly consumption budget Ch, which is modelled according to the theory of buffer-stock saving behavior
(Carroll, 2001; Deaton, 1992), stating that households consume more or less than their net income with the aim to get a
target ratio C of liquid wealth25 Wh to total net income yh,net. In particular, being the total net income yh,net given by:
yh,net = (1 − N) yLh + (1 − K )(yEh + yBh ), (A.13)
where N and K are the tax rates on labor and capital income, respectively, the monthly consumption budget Ch is determined
by:
Ch = yh,net + C (Wf − Cyh,net), (A.14)
where C gives the speed of adjustment of consumption to meet the desired wealth to income target ratio. Therefore,
households consume more (less) than their net income if their liquid wealth if higher (lower) than a multiple C of their net
income.
In particular, households’ decision about the product to buy is driven by purchasing probabilities based on the values
they attach to the different choices. Choice probabilities depend only on prices, as consumption goods are homogenous and
therefore no quality differences is considered. Then, based on goods’ prices, households use a logit model and calculate the
purchasing probability, which is higher if the price is lower. Once the household has selected a good, he spends his entire
weekly budget for that good. If the desired quantity is not fully available he spends as much as possible on that good, then
selecting another one. If he is rationed again, he transfers the remaining budget to the following week.
Central bank
The central bank is in charge of monetary policy, which consists of two main tasks: to provide liquidity in inﬁnite supply
to banks, whenever they need it, and to set the monthly policy rate rCB, which is the cost banks pay when borrowing liquidity.
In particular, at the beginning of each month, the central bank collects the information about the latest values of inﬂation
and unemployment in the Eurace economy and sets the policy rate rCB for the incoming month as follows:
rCB = 	C + r∗ + ω	(	C − 	ˆC ) + ω(ˆN − N), (A.15)
where 	C is the last realized value of the inﬂation rate, measured in a yearly moving window, r* is the assumed real interest
rate, 	ˆC is the inﬂation target, ˆN is the unemployment target, and N is the previous month unemployment rate.
It is worth noting that Eq. (A.15) resembles the well known Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993), but departs from the standard
one for including a sort of unemployment gap, i.e., (ˆN − N), instead of the usual output gap. The reason of this choice is
practical as it is not obvious, in particular in an agent-based model, how the output gap could be measured. However, the
two measures are clearly strongly interconnected and the unemployment gap used in Eq. (A.15) is certainly a satisfactory
indicator of economic recession.
Government
The government is in charge of both ﬁscal and welfare policies. The revenues of the government come from taxes that arePlease cite this article in press as: Teglio, A., et al., Budgetary rigour with stimulus in lean times: Policy advices from an
agent-based model. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.016
applied to four sources: corporate earnings, consumption, capital income (dividends and bond coupons) and labour income
(wages and unemployment beneﬁts). Taxes are collected on a monthly basis, while the four related tax rates are usually
revised yearly, depending on the particular ﬁscal policy adopted, as outline in Section 3.
22 The reservation wage is set equal to the last received wage and is therefore heterogeneous among households.
23 The unemployment beneﬁt is set at a fraction ıU of the last salary received by the households.
24 The transfer payment is set to a fraction ıT of the average wage paid by ﬁrms.
25 The liquid wealth is given by liquidity plus the market value of the stocks and government bonds portfolio.
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Governments expenditures include the labor cost of public sector employees,26 unemployment beneﬁts, transfers and
overnment bond coupons.
On a monthly basis, if in short of liquidity, the government decides to issues new bonds, which are directly sold in the
ond market at a discounted price with respect to the market price pG, and then purchased by households.
Government bonds are perpetuities that pay a monthly ﬁxed coupon that depends on the bond nominal value pˆG and the
xed nominal yearly interest rate rG. Government bond market price depends on households’ trading behavior, which, like
n the stock market case, is characterized by a mix  of chartists, random and fundamentalist typical patterns. In particular, in
he case of bonds, the fundamental price is determined by discounting the supposedly risk-free future bond coupons with
he central bank policy rate.
ppendix B. Validation
Initialization and input validation
The initialization of the Eurace model complies with two main requirements: stock-ﬂow consistency and input validation.
The dynamic stock-ﬂow consistency of agents’ balance sheets is a crucial feature of the Eurace model, and at time zero
ll the balance sheets should be accurately initialized in a consistent way. In addition, the initialization phase allows us to
rovide the model with parameters and initial values gathered from the literature or from empirical evidence. In particular
e initialize the model with correct economic ratios, derived from real world data.
In order to achieve these objectives we developed a speciﬁc software that is able to carry out the initialization auto-
atically. We  deﬁne in this software all the cross-relations between the balance sheet items of the economic agents and
e control for the consistency of the process. We  start the initialization by setting at 1 the initial value of the nominal
onthly wage, and we use it as a reference for all other variables. For example, from household’s wage we derive its total
nitial wealth, according to standard wealth-to-income ratios. Then we  allocate households’ wealth among liquidity, bank
eposits and ﬁnancial assets (stocks and bonds), again according to realistic economic ratios. On the other side, households
eposits provide the value of banks liabilities, allowing us to correctly initialize the other items of bank’s balance sheets. The
ame happens with the equity of the ﬁrms, derived by households shares, which allow us to initialize ﬁrms balance sheets,
ncluding their capital stock, which in turn can be used to initialize loans on banks asset side. This dynamic initialization
rocess allows us to have a consistent model at the beginning of the simulation, where initial conditions have been chosen in
rder to keep realistic proportions among the different items of agents’ balance sheets, and to correctly size stocks and ﬂows
imensions. It is worth noting that agents’ balance sheets elements are highly interconnected, and that a correct process
rastically reduces the degrees of freedom of the whole initialization procedure.
Concerning some examples of the economic ratios for initialization, the debt-to-equity ratio of ﬁrms is initialized at 2,
hich is a realistic value for industrial companies. Risk (weighted) assets to equity ratio for banks is set to 5. The wealth-
o-income ratio for households is set around 70, with 30% of households ﬁnancial wealth allocated into banks deposits, and
he remaining 70% into ﬁnancial assets. The initial value of public debt is set to a value that, assuming a 10% unemployment
ate and the initial productive capacity of ﬁrms, would set the debt-to-GDP ratio around to 100%, which is in line with the
urozone.
This approach is actually part of an ex-ante validation method, called “input validation” (Cirillo and Gallegati, 2012),
here model’s ﬁtness is ensured by setting parameter values and variables ratios according to empirical analysis of actual
ata. The other pillar of input validation consists in designing realistic behavioral and institutional features, as we  have
hown in the previous appendix. Therefore, we do not use any indirect calibration, according to Windrum et al. (2007), but
e adopt a hyper-realistic approach by trying to feed the model ex-ante with empirical parameter values.
Empirical validation
In this section, we analyze the outcomes of the model in order to check if they match some relevant macroeconomic
tylized facts.
The tables presented in the paper show that the magnitude of the endogenously generated economic indicators are quite
ealistic. In Table 4 we ﬁnd that values of debt/gdp for the different policy cases range from 99% to 160%, levels of deﬁcit/gdp
ange from 1% to 7%, and level of bond yields from 8% to 14%. These numerical values of highly aggregated and entirely
ndogenous indicators are surprisingly accurate, and should be interpreted as symptom of the ﬁtness of the model. We
hould also cite the unemployment rate that in general ranges from 3.99% to 5.57% (Table 8), reaching peaks that range from
9% to 40% during crises (Table 6). In general, the outcomes of the model are realistic and this is not inferable by the micro
peciﬁcation of the model, because it is the result of a complex process of interaction.
We also present a brief analysis of some main stylized facts that can be found for instance in Uribe and Schmitt-GrohePlease cite this article in press as: Teglio, A., et al., Budgetary rigour with stimulus in lean times: Policy advices from an
agent-based model. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.016
2017), Watson and Stock (1999), Napoletano et al. (2006). Fig. B.12 and Table B.15 show that the model matches the standard
acts about volatility of investments and consumption. We  use here the relative standard deviation (RSD) as a measure of
olatility. Table B.16 shows the correlation structure of the real GDP. We  observe that GDP is positively correlated with
nvestments and consumption, and it is anti-correlated with the unemployment rate. GDP also shows a positive correlation
26 The number of public employees is set at a ﬁxed percentage ıG of the total household population.
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Fig. B.12. Average level of consumption and investment (left panel) and hp ﬁltered series of consumption and investment (right panel) across 50 seeds.
Table B.15
Means and relative standard deviation (RSD) of yearly level of real GDP, consumption and investment, computed over 50 seeds; Standard error in parenthesis.
Average growth rates of real GDP, consumption and investment across 50 seeds, with standard deviation, standard error (SE) and relative standard deviation
(RSD).
Series Levels Growth rates
Mean RSD Mean St. deviation SE RSD
GDP 3.4693e+04 0.3557 0.0485 0.0060 0.0008 0.1237
(171.86) (0.0027)
Consumption 2.4105e+04 0.2449 0.0426 0.0035 0.0005 0.0824
(84.87) (0.0024)
Investment 3.8289e+03 0.9956 0.0994 0.0565 0.0080 0.5684
(75.71) (0.0056)
Table B.16
Cross-correlation of hp ﬁltered series vs real GDP. Standard errors of Monte Carlo simulations in parentheses.
Filtered series t − 4 t − 3 t − 2 t − 1 t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4
GDP 0.1308 0.3382 0.5685 0.7989 1.0000 0.7989 0.5685 0.3382 0.1308
(0.0148) (0.0130) (0.0099) (0.0070) (0.0000) (0.0070) (0.0099) (0.0130) (0.0148)
Consumption 0.1906 0.3391 0.5178 0.6806 0.6480 0.4524 0.2428 0.0527 −0.1134
(0.0180) (0.0167) (0.0163) (0.0158) (0.0172) (0.0179) (0.0144) (0.0107) (0.0121)
Investment 0.0564 0.2327 0.4210 0.6216 0.8934 0.7480 0.5782 0.4013 0.2406
(0.0148) (0.0149) (0.0144) (0.0135) (0.0096) (0.0119) (0.0129) (0.0135) (0.0127)
Loans  0.6187 0.5816 0.4956 0.3564 0.1500 −0.0891 −0.2876 −0.4404 −0.5462
(0.0109) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0105) (0.0100) (0.0104) (0.0106) (0.0103) (0.0098)
Unemployment −0.1628 −0.2016 −0.2292 −0.2422 −0.2344 −0.1829 −0.1085 −0.0334 0.0341
(0.0107) (0.0115) (0.0131) (0.0151) (0.0166) (0.0155) (0.0116) (0.0077) (0.0069)
Bankruptcies 0.0997 0.1003 0.1040 0.0730 −0.0726 −0.1566 −0.1708 −0.1739 −0.1594
(0.0122) (0.0121) (0.0120) (0.0104) (0.0124) (0.0182) (0.0219) (0.0220) (0.0193)
Table B.17
Cross-correlation of the main ﬁnancial variables. Standard errors of Monte Carlo simulations in parentheses.
Filtered series t − 4 t − 3 t − 2 t − 1 t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4
Stock vs −0.2341 −0.2753 −0.2739 −0.2305 −0.1701 −0.1077 −0.0569 −0.0245 −0.0046
Bond  price (0.0180) (0.0184) (0.0226) (0.0293) (0.0364) (0.0409) (0.0417) (0.0393) (0.0346)
cb  rate vs 0.2303 0.2159 0.1897 0.1528 0.1031 0.0378 −0.0145 −0.0526 −0.0764
Bond  yield (0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0102) (0.0093) (0.0080) (0.0069) (0.0067) (0.0072) (0.0080)
Stock  returns vs 0.1152 0.0949 0.0680 0.0381 0.0214 0.0169 0.0174 0.0219 0.0246
GDP  gr. rate (0.0158) (0.0166) (0.0171) (0.0174) (0.0170) (0.0159) (0.0143) (0.0128) (0.0117)
Gov.  debt vs 0.5880 0.5907 0.5938 0.5974 0.6013 0.5921 0.5825 0.5727 0.5623
Bond  yield (0.0340) (0.0348) (0.0357) (0.0366) (0.0375) (0.0375) (0.0375) (0.0376) (0.0376)
with loans to ﬁrms, which are leading the business cycle expansion, while it shows an anti-correlation with ﬁrms’ defaults,
which are following a cycle contraction. This results are in line with stylized facts on the credit cycle (see for instance
Cappiello et al. (2010)).
We also show some facts related to the ﬁnancial variables of the model in Table B.17. The central bank policy rate is
positively correlated with the bond yield, leading its variations. Stock prices are anti-correlated with bond prices, and a fall
of the stock price index seems to lead an increase in the bond price.
As expected, bond yields are also correlated with government debt, as new bond issuing in general decreases bonds’ price.Please cite this article in press as: Teglio, A., et al., Budgetary rigour with stimulus in lean times: Policy advices from an
agent-based model. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.016
Results also show a weak correlation between GDP growth rate and stock returns, where stock returns tend to anticipate
GDP growth (although the relation between economic growth and equity returns is not easy to disentangle; see for instance
Ritter (2005)).
Finally, Fig. B.13 shows the most relevant cross-correlations included in the tables.
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Fig. B.13. Cross-correlations. Time series considered are monthly and hp ﬁltered.
Table B.18
Tax multiplier means. Standard errors of Monte Carlo simulations in parentheses.
Policy Tax multiplier
3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months
SGP −1.38 (0.02) −1.54 (0.03) −0.52 (0.02) 0.04 (0.03)
p
c
c
t
i
a
t
d
a
a
dSGP  + U + QE + FA −1.87 (0.08) −2.78 (0.12) −2.11 (0.15) −1.69 (0.14)
SGP  + U + QE + FA (recessions) −3.26 (0.20) −5.36 (0.26) −3.87 (0.30) −2.72 (0.28)
Computing ﬁscal multipliers
We  compute a tax multiplier and a public transfers multiplier. The tax multiplier is computed analyzing the time series
roduced by the main experiment of the paper. We  observe the percentage variation in the tax rate (in general, and during
rises) and we compute the related variation in GDP growth in the subsequent four quarters. The transfers multiplier is
omputed by running a new experiment, where we  consider positive and negative shocks to the public transfers (one every
wo years) and we compute the related variation in the GDP in the subsequent six quarters.
Tax multipliers shown in Table B.18 represent an ensemble average of 50 different seeds. The time series of GDP and taxes
nclude the last ﬁfteen years of simulation, from year 9 to year 24. For this analysis, two policy scenarios are included, i.e. SGP
nd SGP + U + QE + FA.  In SGP scenario, tax rates are only revised every ﬁrst day of the year. Therefore, we have determined
he ﬁscal multiplier by considering the yearly changes in tax rate (when it occurs) and the following growth rates of the
etrended GDP monthly series. However, in SGP + U + QE + FA scenario, tax rates are revised both with a ﬁxed yearly frequencyPlease cite this article in press as: Teglio, A., et al., Budgetary rigour with stimulus in lean times: Policy advices from an
agent-based model. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.016
nd during recessions. Hence, in the computation of the tax multiplier for the SGP + U + QE + FA scenario, we take into account
ll the tax rate changes. Moreover, we have also computed the tax multiplier related only to the tax rate changes occurring
uring recessions.
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Table B.19
Transfers multiplier means. Standard errors of Monte Carlo simulations in parentheses.
Shock Transfers multiplier computed using levels
3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 15 months 18 monthsPositive 1.39 (0.06) 1.10 (0.03) 0.80 (0.01) 0.50 (0.02) 0.44 (0.01) 0.39 (0.01)
Negative 0.32 (0.08) 0.32 (0.05) 0.25 (0.03) 0.12 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 0.03 (0.16)
The multiplier values are negative, unveiling and inverse relation between taxation and GDP. Furthermore, in the
SGP + U + QE + FA scenario, the multiplier is lower, showing that effects of tax rate changes during recession are stronger
than in the baseline scenario. It is interesting to notice that the effect of the tax reduction is higher in the ﬁrst six months and
then decreases to close-to-zero value in the case of the Stability and Growth Pact policy. We  see a similar declining pattern
in the case of active ﬁscal policy during recessions, but the multiplier seems more persistent, indicating an higher utility of
these policies during crises.
In order to calculate the public transfers multiplier, we run a new set of simulations characterized by exogenous shocks
on the transfers. In the model, public transfers are computed yearly as a ﬁxed fraction of the average wage and paid monthly
to households. We  set six biennials exogenous shocks, half of them being positive and half negative. The intensity of the
shocks is given by a percent change of the ﬁxed fraction used to compute transfers. The public transfers multiplier is then
calculated whenever a shock occurs and it is given by the ratio of the changes in the GDP levels over the change of public
transfers levels. Table B.19 shows the averages of transfer multipliers, classiﬁed into positive and negative shocks.
The value of the transfers multiplier is positive, suggesting that positive (negative) shocks to the public transfers result
in a change of GDP levels of the same sign. The sign and values of multiplier is in line with the existing literature. Batini et al.
(2014) provide a survey on the literature on ﬁscal multipliers, both from theoretical and empirical perspective. Generally,
ﬁscal multipliers have values between 0 and 1, but they can also exceed 1 in different cases. Moreover, the table shows that
the effects of transfers is higher in case of positive shocks rather than negative ones. This could be due also to the positive
GDP growth trend in our artiﬁcial economies. We can notice, again, that the value of the multiplier is declining with time.
Although there is little consensus in the literature on the size of the multipliers and on the methodology to compute them,
our results ﬁt with the majority of empirical and modeling works’ ﬁnding. For instance, Riera-Crichton et al. (2016) show that
value of tax rate multiplier is negative, with a value between 0.66 and 3.69, depending on the horizons considered. Several
studies agree on the state-dependence of ﬁscal multipliers, see e.g. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) for empirical results.
Napoletano et al. (2015) design an agent-based model in order to study the ﬁscal multiplier evolution over the business
cycle, ﬁnding that the size of the multiplier is time-varying and it is determined by the persistence of credit rationing in the
economy. These ﬁndings are in line with our experiments, as shown in Tables B.18 and B.19.
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